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Introduction
By RIcHARD B. CUNNINGHAM*

Constitutional issues pervade the law of land use regulation,
yet it is only in the last decade that they have begun to receive
recognition by the United States Supreme Court. The first of the
"modern" cases, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,1 was announced
in 1974, a year that coincidentally was marked by the first volume
of the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly.2 In the intervening

years the Court, and the Quarterly, have dealt with several aspects
of land use controls, including state growth management,3 suburban exclusionary zoning, 4 equal protection in rezoning,5 municipal
regulation of private housing arrangements and commercial adult
entertainment,7 historic preservation,8 municipal liabilities under
the Civil Rights9 and Sherman Antitrust Acts,10 and troublesome
* B.S., 1966, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1969, University of California,
Davis; LL.M., 1971, George Washington National Law Center; Professor, Hastings College
of the Law. [The editorial staff wishes to thank Professor Cunningham for helping plan this
symposium, and for generously sharing his time and expertise throughout the project.]
1. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
2. The first issue contained an analysis of growth limitation techniques. Note, Battle
Of The Heavyweights: In This CornerEnvironmentalRights And In The Far CornerFree
Travel Rights, 1 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1974).
3. Selinger, Van Dyke, Amano, Takenaka & Young, Selected ConstitutionalIssues
Related to Growth Management in the State of Hawaii,5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 639 (1978).
4. Burns, Class Struggle In The Suburbs: Exclusionary Zoning Against The Poor, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975); Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and
Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 1015 (1976); Note, So You Want To Move
To The Suburbs: Policy Formulation And The Constitutionality Of Municipal GrowthRestrictingPlans, 3 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 803 (1976); Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial ProbabilityTest, 3 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 485 (1976).
5. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
6. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Frame & Scorza, Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property Rights, Personal Rights and The Liberal Regime, 2 HAsTNGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975).
7." Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
10. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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issues of procedural due process in local land use regulation.,'
Throughout that period, however, the paramount constitutional issue in the minds of the public and land use professionals has been
the taking issue: the application of Fifth Amendment prohibitions
against the "taking" of property without compensation.
As this Symposium was conceived, it was widely expected (and
in some quarters, feared) that the case of Agins v. City of
Tiburon"-the Court's first direct confrontation with compensatory taking in land regulatory matters-would produce significant
advancement in this little understood but much-discussed area of
our law. Those hopes (or fears) were dashed by the inconclusive
result of Agins, and the Quarterly moved instead to place Agins,
its heir apparent, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego,'3 and the taking issue into the broader context of the scope
of review and the modes of relief available to the judiciary when
dealing with land use regulation litigation.
As local governments adopt increasingly sophisticated methods of land use control the judiciary has been forced to employ
new methods of review, and where necessary, to design new forms
of relief to deal with newly emergent issues. The breadth of local
regulations is now so extensive that with only slight variations the
same form of local regulation variously might be characterized as
boldly innovative, discretely exclusionary or a blatantly invalid
"taking" of property rights, giving rise to laudatory holdings of validity, cautious skepticism, prohibitory injunction, invalidation, or
award of monetary damages based on state or federal constitutional or statutory grounds!
The range of factors that is involved is reflected by the articles
herein; each addresses a related aspect of the problem. Many of
the articles reflect the implicit belief that there will be no single
answer fashioned in either the state or federal court systems, because of historic and pragmatic policies that will continue to be
respected by our judiciary.
Fred Bosselman and Joel Bonder initiate the discussion of
11.

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Kahn, In

Accordance with a ConstitutionalPlan: ProceduralDue Process and Zoning Decisions, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011 (1979).
12. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
13. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (App. 1978), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 49
U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981).
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remedies with their contemporary examination of local government
liability under developing civil rights and antitrurst theories. The
substantial potential for increased liability, despite many of the
policies discussed elsewhere in this issue, leads to an examination
of those aspects of a land use control system that can enable a
local government to enjoy some of the immunity from liability that
is accorded to the states.
Professor Daniel Mandelker incisively examines the "inversion" that land use case law has effected in the remedies typically
available in private litigation; instead of the monetary damages
that are the norm, land use cases regularly employ remedial injunctive relief against the government. That pattern is threatened
by the recent interest in compensatory relief for inverse condemnation that has been popularized by the Agins and San Diego cases.
Professor Mandelker asserts that sound policies dictate against inverse condemnation as a remedy for excesses of local regulation,
and suggests instead that modifications in the judicial application
of injunctive relief are a preferable alternative.
The policies and considerations suggested by Professor
Mandelker are further developed by Professor Roger Cunningham
who, after examining the problem of remedies as it developed in
the California case law, was able to compare those results to the
new rule suggested in Justice Brennan's important dissent in San
Diego. Professor Cunningham suggests that Justice Brennan's
forceful interpretation of the regulatory taking rule may indeed
command wide support if it can be modified to include judicial invalidation among the legitimate means of reversing or halting
those governmental actions that constitute a regulatory taking.
Such a modification would be supported by the policies previously
argued, and would be much more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. The undoubted difficulty that state and federal courts
will encounter in attempting to apply the apparant teachings of
San Diego will not be easily overcome, but Professor Cunningham
proceeds to demonstrate that monetary damages for "temporary"
takings may be a desirable partial solution, in a manner similar to
that which is potentially available under the emerging section 1983
Civil Rights Act actions.
Professor Robert Wright demonstrates that traditional zoning,
and the newer forms of land use control that it has spawned, are
inherently exclusionary and must inevitably remain so. With spe-
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cific reference to the taking issue, he argues that innovative implementation of the police power in furtherance of the public interest
ought not be weakened by the necessity of "making retribution in
damages for a resultant mistake." Other aspects of exclusionary
zoning employed by some governments-"Citadels of Privilege"-are discussed by Annette Kolis, who argues that the exclusionary tendency of municipal regulation inevitably contributes to
our present national housing supply dilemma. She demonstrates
that many innovative courts have found that exclusionary ordinances can be selectively reviewed, often with an intensive examination of the resulting impact on regional public welfare. The difficulty raised by both articles concerns the means by which the
judiciary must perform its unenviable task; where judicial review,
either traditional or innovative, determines that local regulations
violate applicable legal standards, what effective remedies are
available to resolve the interests of the local governments, private
landowners, and the larger concerns of the region?
The law of regulatory takings is finally moving beyond the
simplistic approach represented by the first sixty years of its development, but it has only begun to engage the extensive questions of
social and fiscal policy raised by the articles in this issue. We have
yet to define adequately a taking, and we are only beginning to
develop the techniques by which a taking is to be remedied. The
process promises to be a lengthy one, in which this Symposium
continues the Quarterly's tradition of encouraging constitutional
analysis. It should be a welcome addition to the literature of land
use law.

